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I. Introduction 
Over the last decade, Mexico's economy has been undergoing a 
series of exciting changes. In 1983, Mexico was still a highly 
inward-oriented economy with a government that was outspoken in its 
criticism of multinational cooperations. Today, Mexico ranks among 
the most outwardly-oriented developing economies of the world 
(Nunez 7). The present administration, under the leadership of 
President Salinas, has implemented significant changes aimed at 
liberalizing Mexico's policy towards foreign direct investment 
(FOI). The changes in Mexico's policy have been largely in response 
to the 1982 debt crisis and deteriorating economic conditions. This 
study deals with the way in which macro-economic conditions, 
political and economic stability', and policy incentives influence 
FOI flows to Mexico. Specifically, the model examines the effect of 
Salinas' policy initiatives on FOI in Mexico. 
Research in this area is meaningful for many reasons. First, 
being the world's fifteenth largest economy, Mexico is clearly an 
important member of today' s global economy. Over the last few 
decades, Mexico's economy has been experiencing impressive growth 
rates. In 1975, Mexico's real gross domestic product (GOP) grew by 
, Political and economic stability are very closely related. 
Even in industrialized countries like the US, whether a president 
is successfully re~elected for a second term depends on the 
economy's performance. In less developed nations, economic hardship 
can bring about political unrest. Political instability also 
hampers economic growth. As such, the terms "political stability" 
and "economic stability" will often be used interchangeably. 
1
 
•
 
5.7%2. In the early 1980s, real growth rates were between 8% and 
9%. In 1982 however, the real growth rate plunged to an alarming 
4%. In recent years, the growth rate has been between 1.87% in 1987 
and 3.98% in 1990. Some of the slowdown in GOP growth rates can be 
attributed to the debt crisis in 1982. Mexico also has its share of 
economic problems. Many of the recent economic reforms, including 
the change in Mexico's policies towards FOI, have been in response 
to the sudden slowdown. Nevertheless, Mexico's economy has still 
been doing relatively well. As such, it is hardly surprising that 
Mexico is among the largest recipients of FOI from the 
industrialized nations. Over the period from 1955-1982, Mexico 
received over $13.44 billion in FOI (Nunez 17). 
FOI flows to Mexico are expected to continue to grow rapidly 
over the next decade. Part of this is due to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico. 
Among these three nations, Mexico has the comparative advantage in 
low-skill, labor intensive production. Under the auspices of NAFTA, 
multinational enterprises can set up cost efficient production 
facilities in Mexico and have access to the vast US and Canadian 
markets as well. 
The decision to engage in FOI is a long and deliberate 
process. It is a decision that involves a long term commitment of 
the multinational corporation's time, effort and resources. There 
2 Refer to Graph 1. 
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Graph 1 : FDI vs GROWTH
 
Mexico, 1971-1990 
1400.00,--------------------------------.....10.00% 
.................................................................................................... 8.00%
 
Q.. ~ 6.00% oen 1000.00 C' ~ 
..- (ij
o 4.00% ~ ~ 600.00 C 
.Q 
2.00% 
600.00 ~ 
C)o 0.00% _
I.L. c (I)(ij 
(I) 400.00 ~ 
a: 
-2.00% ~ 
-4.00% 
0.00...L-r---r-.---,--,-----,-,-----,---,-----,,--,--r---r-,-----r-,-----,.-.,-----,-...,.......L.6.00% 
1971 197219731974197519761977 1978197919801981198219631984198519861987198819891990 
Year 
[ --- REAL FDI ~ GROWTH 
From the above graph, it is reasonably clear that there is a positive 
relationship between growth and FDI. This supports the findings of this 
study. 
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are many factors that need to be taken into consideration. Not all 
of these factors are economic in nature. In fact, one of the 
primary considerations is political risk. Clearly, a nation that is 
likely to experience a coup is not a viable location for FOI. As 
such, any model that does not attempt to model political and 
economic stability would be incomplete. 
This study incorporates the effects of government policy on 
FOI. The current stance of the Mexico's policy makers on this issue 
cannot be more different than it was two decades ago, when the "Law 
for the promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of Foreign 
Investment" of 1973 was passed. This piece of legislation severely 
restricted foreign ownership rights in Mexico. Since his election 
in 1988, President Salinas has implemented various pOlicies aimed 
specifically at attracting foreign capital. In a recent interview 
with Forbes, Salinas states" We know we have to be competitive [in 
tax rates] on an international level if we are to compete for 
capital, which in the Nineties will be the key question for 
economic success or failure" (64). Among other things, Mexico does 
not tax capital gains. Given this radical about-face in pOlicies 
towards FOI, Mexico is the ideal candidate for this study of the 
effect of the government's policy stance on FOI flows. 
II. Literature Review 
There exists a vast body of literature that pertains to the 
FOI decision process. Over twenty years ago, Stephen Hymer 
pioneered work in this area with his seminal thesis on FOI and 
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multinational enterprises. Since then, research in this area has 
taken off in many directions. Today, literature on FOI and the 
multinational corporation crosses disciplines. Substantial work on 
this sUbject can be found among the literature on international 
economics, international business, and finance. 
Most of the existing research concentrates heavily on the 
micro-economic considerations behind an individual firm's decision 
to invest abroad. Although these studies are not directly related 
to my research, they provide the micro-economic foundation upon 
which I can build my macro-economic model. My base model was put 
together under the guidance of Dr. Jian Hai Lin from the 
International Monetary Fund. He has conducted a similar study on 
Malaysia and singapore. Dr. Lin discovered that in Malaysia, a 
sophisticated and relatively low cost labor force is of primary 
importance in attracting FOI. In his study, the impact of 
government policy incentives on FOI in Malaysia seemed to play a 
minimal role. In Singapore however, Dr. Lin discovered that FOI 
flows are positively related to incentives and inversely related 
to relative labor costs and inflation rates (44). 
My literature search was conducted in three stages. First, I 
looked for past theoretical and empirical work that supports the 
inclusion of the variables in my base model. Then, I researched 
past work on political risk assessment. Concurrently, I also looked 
for research related to the effects of government policy incentives 
on FOI flows. 
According to Dr. Lin, the growth rate of the market, relative 
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labor costs, net exports, government debt, and inflation are 
important determinants of FDI. In the literature, there is much 
support for the importance of the growth rate of the market. 
Daniels and Radebaugh poi~t out that one of the primary motives for 
investing abroad is to gain market access (194). Dr. Lin found that 
the growth rate of the market (GDP growth) is a key variable in 
explaining FDI in singapore and Malaysia (59). In theory, the MNC 
need not set up a plant inside a country in order to gain access to 
its market. The MNC can also gain market access by licensing and 
exporting. However, there are other real world considerations that 
often render these options unrealistic. An important example is 
transportation costs. For some products, the cost of transportation 
makes it impractical to export the good over any great distance. 
other factors include trade barriers and consumers' preference for 
domestically produced goods (Daniels and Radebaugh, 195-197). 
Daniels and Radebaugh identify production costs as another 
important determinant of FDI. The realities of competing in a 
global marketplace make it necessary for MNCs to seek out the most 
cost efficient sources of raw materials and factors of production 
(194). An empirical study by Cushman on the effects of real wages 
and labor productivity on FDI failed to support the theory that 
real wages are an important determinant of FDI in the us. Richard 
Caves argues that the decision to undertake FDI is a function of 
the cost of home production relative to the cost of foreign 
production. Since global financial markets are very integrated, 
capital has become very mobile. It is not so with labor. As such, 
6
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the country with a comparative advantage in low cost labor will be 
a net recipient of foreign capital (Caves, 21). 
In the literature, there is disagreement over the effect of 
the trade balance on FDI •.The political risk assessment literature 
identifies the trade balance as an indicator of a country's 
political and economic stability. Persistently high trade deficits 
can result in the restriction of foreign exchange transfers. This 
inhibits the ability of the MNC to repatriate its profits. The 
government may also attempt to reduce imports by devaluing the 
local currency or by restricting imports of certain goods. MNCs 
often depend on external sources for their inputs to production. As 
such, a devaluation of the local currency increases production 
costs as intermediate goods become more expensive. Similarly, 
import restrictions raises production costs or impedes production. 
In this sense, a high trade deficit discourages FDI (Bunn ahd 
Mustafaoglu, 1565-66). 
It is also argued that a high trade deficit weakens the 
country's currency. On the one hand, this makes it more expensive 
for MNCs to import intermediate goods. On the other hand a weaker 
currency should stimulate demand for the country's exports, 
stimulate production and consequently, raise income and improve the 
population's purchasing power (Madura, 484). As such, the MNC will 
be able to sell more of its products both within the country and 
, 
export more to the rest of the world. In this sense, a high trade 
deficit may be appealing to foreign investors. Clearly, the 
literature does not tell us whether a high trade deficit should be 
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considered an indication of economic stability or economic 
instability. 
Another important indicator of economic stability is the 
external debt level. This is very closely related to the trade 
deficit in that a sustained trade deficit year after year 
contributes to the external debt level. The external debt figure 
includes government and private debt. A high government debt level 
discourages FOI. This is especially true if the government is an 
important customer of the MNC in that a large debt may curtail the 
purchasing power of the government and hence harm the profitability 
of the MNC (Madura 484). High private debt levels are also harmful 
in that they contribute to the overall level of external debt. A 
high external debt level does not inspire confidence in investors 
in that there is a higher risk of the country defaUlting on its 
external obligations. This does not help the country's economy or 
the MNC's profitability. This was exactly the case with Mexico in 
the 1982 debt crisis. Mexico's high external debt3 level can be 
linked to the plunge in the real GOP growth rate' and the decrease 
in FOI to Mexico. 
Finally, inflation is significant because inflation affects 
the purchasing power of consumers and as a result, consumer demand 
for the MNC's products (Madura 482). Nunez points out that 
inflation also pushes up the costs of production and may eat into 
3 Refer to Graph 2. 
, Refer to Graph 1. 
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GRAPH 2 : FDI vs.· DEBT
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The graph suggests that the relationship between external debt and FDI is 
somewhat ambiguous. From 1975-1981, the appears to be a positive 
relationship. The opposite is true for all other years. Model A supports the 
positive relationship. DEBT is probably not a good proxy for stability. 
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the profits that an MNC hopes to repatriate (31). Dr Lin also found 
that inflation is a key explanatory variable of FDI in Malaysia and 
singapore (59). 
III. The Base Hodel 
The first step in this study is to estimate the base model. 
The base model uses macro-economic variables to explain FDI into 
Mexico. It does not include the government policy variable. The 
base model is important because the final model can then be 
compared with it. The comparison may yield some insights as to the 
effects of the government policy variable on FDI. The base model 
also gives an initial indication of how well the final model can be 
expected to explain FDI in Mexico. 
FDI in Mexico is hypothesized to be a function of real GDP 
growth, relative labor costs, net exports, government deficit and 
inflation : 
FDI = f(GROWTH, INF, LABOR_US/MEX, NET EXP, DEBT) 
The empirical model is as follows : 
FDI = a + b * GROWTH + c * INF + d * LABOR_US/MEX + e * NET EXP 
+ f * DEBT + error 
Table 1 describes the variables. The data are time series from 
1971-1990. Where applicable, all variables are measured in real 
terms. Data for unit labor costs for both the US and Mexico are not 
available for 1989 and 1990. As such, 015 regressions of US unit 
labor cost and Mexico's unit labor cost as functions of time were 
run. The data for 1989 and 1990 are extrapolated from the results 
10 
TABLE 1 : DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
VARIABLE TYPE DEFINITION 
FDI 
GROWTH 
INF 
LABOR_US/MEX 
LABOR 
NET EXP 
DEBT 
SALINAS 
Dependent 
Macro-economic 
Macro-economic 
Labor cost 
Labor cost 
Stability 
Stability 
Policy 
Mexico's total real foreign direct investment 
% annual growth in Mexico's GDP 
Inflation rate calculated from GDP deflator 
Relative unit labor cost, US/Mexico 
Mexico's unit labor cost 
Mexico's real net exports 
Mexico's external debt - government and private 
Policy variable· dummy 
- 1 Salinas is President 
- 0 otherwise 
Note: Where applicable, all variables are in millions of constant US$. 
•
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of the regressions. 
IV.	 Base Hodel - Hypothesis 
1)	 Real GOP growth (GROWTH) is expected to have a positive 
impact on FOI. This is because a high growth rate will 
attract MNCs that are seeking to expand into new and growing 
markets. 
2)	 Inflation (INF) discourages FOI in that it increases the cost 
of production and eats into the profits that a MNC may hope to 
repatriate. A high inflation rate also slows the real GOP 
growth rate and erodes the purchasing power of Mexican 
consumers. 
3)	 Relative labor cost (LABOR_US/MEX) is expected to have a 
positive impact on FOI. MNCs that have already decided to 
invest in this region are presumably hoping to gain access to 
one or more of the markets in this region (ie the US, Canada 
and Mexico). These MNCs have the option of locating their 
production facilities in the US, Canada, or Mexico. In making 
this decision, relative unit labor costs clearly is an 
important consideration. Production costs in the US and Canada 
are not significantly different. since the US is the largest 
source of FOI in Mexico, I chose to compare US (rather than 
S The regression results are as follows : 
L_US = -49.604 + 0.0255*Year Adjusted R-square = .958 
L Mex = 112.564 - 0.0561*Year Adjusted R-square = .828 
where L us is unit labor cost for the and L Mex is unit 
labor cost for Mexico. 
12 
-canadian) unit labor cost with Mexico's. This is also more 
consistent with the Caves' theory that "domestic" (US) vs 
foreign production costs are important. Even if the FOI is from 
outside the US (such ~s the EC), US/Mexico labor costs are the 
relevant costs to be considered because MNCs that choose to 
locate in this region compare production costs in the US (or 
Canada) with production costs in Mexico. As LABOR_US/MEX 
increases, Mexico's labor costs are becoming relatively 
cheaper, thus increasing FOI. 
4)	 LABOR is an alternative measure of production cost. The LABOR 
variable takes only Mexico's productivity adjusted labor costs 
into account. As Mexico's labor cost increases, FOI should 
decrease. 
5)	 The expected sign of Net Exports (NET_EXP) is uncertain. On 
the one hand, continued high trade deficits can result in 
restrictions on foreign exchange transfers. This inhibits the 
ability of the MNC to repatriate profits. The government may 
also attempt to reduce imports by devaluating the local 
currency or by resricting the imports of intermediate goods 
that the MNC depends on. This discourages FOI. Also a trade 
deficit results in a lower exchange rate. Although this makes 
imports of intermediate goods more expensive, it also makes the 
country's exports more competitive in world markets. Foreign 
investors often find this aspect of a lower exchange rate 
appealing. As such, the ultimate effect of a high trade deficit 
is ambiguous. 
13 
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6)	 External debt (DEBT) is expected to be negatively related 
to FDI. A large debt level increases the probabil i ty of 
default. This is an indication of the economic and political 
instability and as such, should discourage FDI. 
v. Base Hodel - Results 
The empirical model was regressed using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). Two separate models are regressed. Model A uses includes all 
variables discussed in the hypotheses section except LABOR. This is 
because LABOR and LABOR_US/MEX are alternative measures of 
production costs. As such, they are used interchangeably. The data 
are time series, from 1970-1990. All data have been extracted from 
the World Bank's World Tables 1992. The results are summarized in 
Table 2. 
First, Model A is discussed. Besides LABOR US/MEX, all of the 
variables are significant. The GROWTH variable has the largest 
coefficient. It is also significant at the alpha = .10 level. As 
hypothesized, the GDP growth rate is important in explaining FDI to 
Mexico. The pattern of FDI and GROWTH in Graph 1 supports this 
result. The INF variable is also statistically significant and 
turned out as predicted. 
The NET_EXP variable turned out to be negative. This supports 
the theory that a high trade deficit is an indication of economic 
instability. Evidently, MNCS weigh the risk of devaluation, foreign 
exchange restrictions and import restrictions more heavily than the 
advantages associated with exporting from a country with a more 
14 
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TABLE 3: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FDI 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
EXPECTED 
SIGN MODEL A MODEL B 
GROWTH + 2955.511 
(1.6096) 
2170.306 
(1.0047) 
INF - -650.279 
(2.4695) 
-417.126 
(1.6414) 
LABOR_US/MEX + 425.279 
(1.1241 ) 
LABOR - -732.583 
(3.3223) 
NET EXP +/­ -0.265 
(2.7061 
-0.36 
(3.3042) 
DEBT 
-
0.006 
(1.6086) 
SALINAS + 
CONSTANT -221.407 1328.379 
R-SQR 0.787 0.675 
ADJ R-SQR 0.710 0.588 
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competitive exchange rate. 
only the relative labor cost variable (LABOR_USjMEX) is not 
significant at the alpha = .10 level. This may be because in recent 
years, while the US is still the largest investor in Mexico, 
significant pottions of its FDI has been coming from other parts of 
the world as well. This may cause the results to be somewhat 
distorted. From Graph 3, it appears that until the late 70s, there 
was a positive relationship between FDI and LABOR_USjMEX. The 
relationship seems to break down after that. 
The sign for the external debt variable (DEBT) did not turn 
out as expected. However, the size of the coefficient is also 
small. I suspect that net exports (NET_EXP) and external debt 
(DEBT) are closely related. I had intended that they proxy the same 
thing - ·stability. As such, it may be more appropriate to leave 
DEBT6 out of the equation. The regression explains 71.0286 % of FDI 
flows to Mexico. 
Model B is a variation of Model A. LABOR is used instead of 
LABOR_USjMEX. Based on the results of MODEL A, the DEBT variable is 
dropped. LABOR turned out to be negative and significant at the 
alpha = .01 level7 • The GROWTH variable is insignificant. All other 
variables turned out as expected and are statistically significant. 
6 Refer to Graph 2 for the graphical relationship between FDI 
and DEBT. 
7 Refer to Graph 4. 
16 
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Observe that all of the variables in the Model A and Model B 
are purely macro-economic and stability variables. It is clear from 
the hypotheses that there are sound economic reasons for including 
these variables into the model. These economic variables do a 
fairly good job explaining FDI flows to Mexico. However, from the 
literature search, it is clear that we must also take policy 
incentives and political factors into account in order to get a 
more complete picture of what is really going on. The graphical 
relationship between each of the variables and FDI can be found 
either in the text or appendix. 
IV. Model Including policy Variable 
Dornbusch claims that currently, one of Mexico's critical 
policy issues is "how to generate confidence in the economy" (313). 
This captures the essence of what the Salinas administration is 
trying to do. The only way Salinas can achieve his economic goals 
is to instill confidence in both domestic and foreign investors 
that economic and political conditions in Mexico guarantee a stable 
flow of returns on their investments. In order to achieve this 
goal, the Salinas administration has, among other things, offered 
more competitive tax rates to MNCs. Mexico has also, in recent 
years, relaxed its foreign ownership restrictions. The recent North 
American Free Trade,Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and 
Mexico has also stimulated a lot of confidence in Mexico. I needed 
to come up with a variable that reflects these changes and captures 
the effects of the return of investor confidence in Mexico. 
17 
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The expanded empirical model is essentially the same as Model 
B. The only difference is that a new variable, SALINAS is included 
into the equation. various approaches to modeling policy incentives 
were considered. Initially, I had considered using tax rates on 
MNCs and foreign ownership restrictions. However, I had trouble 
obtaining data for these measures. Upon consultation with Dr. 
Dornbusch, it was confirmed that most of these data simply are not 
available. Dr. Dornbusch suggested that a dummy variable for the 
years Salinas has been in power will probably capture most of the 
effects that I am trying to model. After all, what I am basically 
trying to measure is expectations. 
The SALINAS variable is a dummy variable consisting of 1 for 
the years Salinas has been president (1989 and 1990) and 0 for all 
the other years. Salinas was inaugurated in August, 1988. However, 
the "Salinas effect" is expected to be lagged for two reasons. 
Firstly, the changes the Salinas administration has brought about 
did not occur overnight. These things take time. Secondly, it also 
takes time for MNCs to gather information regarding these reforms. 
A lot of time and resources are involved before an MNC can react to 
the changes implemented by the Salinas administration. A few MNCs 
may even want to wait for awhile before they have confidence in the 
ability of the new government to carry out these changes. As such, 
the SALINAS variable has Is for 1989 and 1990. Clearly, the SALINAS 
variable is expected to have a positive impact on FDI. 
18 
-The expanded empirical model is estimated as follows 
FDI = a + b * GROWTH + c * LABOR + d * NET EXP + e * INF + 
f * SALINAS + error. 
Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables. All previous 
hypotheses apply. The new variable, SALINAS is expected to be 
positively related to FDI. The SALINAS variable represents the 
return of investor confidence in Mexico brought on by all the new 
policy incentives implemented by Salinas. 
v. Expanded Model - Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the OLS regression for the 
expanded model. The results of the Model A and Model B are also 
tabulated for comparison. The models are described as follows: 
MODEL A - Base model. 
MODEL B - Revised base model. Excludes DEBT and uses LABOR 
instead of LABOR_US/MEX. 
MODEL C - MODEL B + SALINAS variable or the expanded model. 
In model C, all the signs turned out as expected. Everything 
except inflation (INF) and unit labor cost (LABOR) is statistically 
significant at the alpha = .10 level. The SALINAS variable is 
statistically significant even at the alpha = .01 level. Its 
coefficient is also large. This suggests that Salinas has managed 
to do a lot for investor confidence in Mexico. In fact, the Salinas 
effect has been so large that apparently it has swamped even the 
effect of Mexico's low unit labor cost (LABOR). The LABOR variable 
was statistically significant in Model B but in Model C, it is not 
significant. By and large Salinas' policies appear to have been 
19
 
-TABLE 3 : OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FDI 
INDEPENDENT EXPECTED 
VARIABLES SIGN MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C 
GROWTH + 2955.511 2170.306 2970.515 
(1.6096) (1.0047) (1.7644) 
INF - -650.279 -417.126 162.941 
(2.4695) (1.6414) (0.6226) 
LABOR_US/MEX + 425.279 
(1.1241) 
LABOR - -732.583 -28.401 
(3.3223) (0.1038) 
NET EXP +/­ -0.265 -0.36 -0.293 
(2.7061 (3.3042) (3.3975) 
DEBT 
-
0.006 
(1.6086) 
SALINAS + 830.836 
(3.3467) 
CONSTANT -221.407 1328.379 29.379 
R-SQR 0.787 0.675 0.819 
ADJ R-SQR 0.710 0.588 0.755 
20
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successful. If reliable data were available, it would be 
interesting to examine the impact of specific studies. 
The fact that the inflation variable (INF) is statistically 
insignificant in the expanded model (Model C) can be explained by 
the inclusion of the SALINAS variable. This is because both 
variables measure expectations. As such, the SALINAS variable must 
have picked up most of the variation caused by expectations. 
The fact that GOP growth rates switched from being 
insignificant (MODEL B) to significant (MODEL C) indicates that the 
GROWTH variable performs much better in conjunction with the 
SALINAS variable. There may be some mUlti-colinearity8. 
Model C has an adjusted r-square of 0.754. Model B's adjusted 
r-square is .587. This tells us that purely economic factors cannot 
completely explain FDI in Mexico. Clearly, policy incentives and 
investor confidence in Mexico's political and economic stability 
should not be overlooked. At the end of this paper, graphs of all 
of the variables are included. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The results of my research suggests that the determinants of 
FDI in Mexico are both economic and political. Investor confidence 
in the political and economic stability of the country is an 
important factor. Often, there is no clearly defined distinction 
8 Since the mUlti-colinearity - if it exists, is not a 
serious problem here, no attempt has been made to deal with it. 
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between a "political variable" and an "economic variable". The two 
are too inter-related in too many ways. As such, the Salinas 
administration has the unenviable task of getting both the politics 
and economics right in order to attract FOI. At this stage, it 
appears as though their policies are having a measurable impact on 
their ability to attract FOI. 
I believe that one of the main reasons Salinas has been so 
successful is that he has managed to structure a very attractive 
incentive package for foreign investors. Salinas has managed to get 
the message across that Mexico is an attractive place to invest. A 
promising avenue of future research would be an assessment of the 
effects of specific policies on FOI. Unfortunately, the data for 
such a study are not available. Hopefully, as research in this area 
receives more attention, reliable and comprehensive data sources 
will become available. 
A shortcoming of this study is that it fails to capture a more 
long-term perspective of the recent developments in Mexico on FOI 
patterns in Mexico. Of particular interest would be an evaluation 
of the overall impact of NAFTA on FOI in Mexico. Since the 
agreement has only recently been signed and will not fUlly take 
effect for a number of years, such a study cannot be undertaken for 
a few years yet. The Mexican - US - Canadian free trade zone 
promises to be one of the most dynamic and exciting economic 
regions in the world. It is also potentially a rich source of 
valuable economic research, particularly in the area of FOI. 
22
 
• 
Appendix 
Graph 3 : FDI vs LABOR_US/MEX
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The data do not suggest a strong positive relationship between relative labor 
costs and FDI. From 1982, the positive relationship seems to break down. This 
indicates that a comparison of labor costs between the US and Mexico may not 
be appropriate. 
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Graph 4 : FDI vs LABOR
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It is quite obvious that there is an inverse relationship between FDI and unit 
labor costs. This is a reasonably good proxy for the importance of production 
costs. 
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-Table 5 : FDI vs NET EXP
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There is a strong negative relationship between net exports and FDI. High 
levels of net exports are consistently associated with relatively lower levels of 
FDI. 
-Graph 6 : FDI vs. INF
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